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Introduction 
(Nov 2007) 
It is a propensity within architectural and general cultural practice to sublimate (to 
reduce to unreality) or eliminate any account of the apparently interior (creative) 
processes to justify an architectural project only by the apparently exterior 
(legislative) processes that circumscribe architectural production.  This favouring 
towards apparently exterior processes promotes two main characters of rhetoric.  On 
one hand, there is the one dimensionality of technical-instrumental-economic 
rationale, that Marcuse finds so revolting, which demands architectural projects to be 
either explicit in their causal relations between ends and means or, seemingly, 
celebratory (fetishist) of technical-instrumental-economic means as ends in 
themselves.  On the other hand, there is a deliberate silence about interior processes, 
romanticising them as utterly inexplicable gifts born of Genius and Grand Design, 
which is equal in force to technical-instrumental-economic rationale as disincentive 
both to those who feel not to be the beneficiaries of such apparently natural 
providence and those who do understand something of the substance and 
importance of these would-be interior processes but fear the difficult challenges set 
by the instrumentality of the world.  This propensity towards exterior processes, 
ironically, but surely obviously, offers very little practical advise for effecting wonderful 
architectural/cultural circumstances.  Furthermore, if one accepts these opening 
statements, it seems quite extraordinary that fussing about rules with such lack of skill 
in creativity and understanding is actually the motor that drives the legislative force 
and consequently much of the expression of what makes  up the greater part of our 
cultivated and built environment.  Given this, it is also obvious, then, that critical 
positions would and should emerge in response to this state of affairs.  Furthermore, it 
might also be logical to expect, or at least hope, that these critical positions will, in 
due course, begin to effect some appropriate changes within the exterior processes 
that govern the generality and, therefore, the measure of liberty for the further 
development of cultural practices.  The author of this paper remains hopeful.   
 
This paper looks at one particular way of coming between the interior and exterior 
worlds of production.  It takes its lead from the work of Paul Ricoeur1.  The chapter, 
Mimesis and Representation, from A Ricoeur Reader: Reflection and Imagination, is 
itself a representation and summary of some principle concerns explored in his three 
volumes (in four parts) Time and Narrative, and poses particular questions of the 
interpretability of texts.  Hermeneutics is as pertinent for architecture as it is for 
philosophy and other cultural studies. This may very well be, as Ricouer suggests, the 
hermeneutical age of reason2.  The opening paragraph above sets out the particular 
urgency that architecture brings to the questions of interpretation and 
representation. The fundamental premise that conditions this paper is in assuming a 
                                                 
1Ricoeur, Paul.  Mimesis and Representation, in A Ricoeur Reader:  Reflection and Imagination, 
edited by Mario J. Valdés.  Toronto:  University of Toronto Press, 1991. 
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Press, 1992, p.25. 
logical parallel between the narratology of architecture and that of texts.  Therefore, 
from the outset, it should be declared that where Ricoeur thinks text this paper thinks 
architectural project; where Ricoeur thinks word language this paper thinks 
architectural language; and where Ricoeur thinks reader this paper thinks interested 
user (the question of a disinterested user is also very important and always in mind but 
not one that is pursued directly here). However, the issue of authorship, ultimately, is 
the central line of questioning for this contribution to the Provocations seminar series: 
how does Ricoeur’s work provide sustenance for a conception and practice of 
authorship that might otherwise be starved by the limited fecundity of instrumentality 
and, furthermore, that might operate autonomous to specific fields of interests, be 
they the persuasive forces of opposition or the disinterestedness of agnostics, yet 
which is still utterly committed to as full as practicably possible a participation in the 
culturally contingent symbolic networks that either completely circumscribe or 
significantly overlap with the specific cultural production that drives authorship in the 
first instance, in my case architecture?  Or, to pose the same question using the terms 
of the specific text currently in focus, how to author in light of both the impasse to 
which the question of representation has been relegated and after the question of 
representation has been returned, via Ricoeur’s triad of mimesis, to its field of play?   
 
Therefore, as the title of this paper prompts, we should get to the heart of what 
concerns us about Mimesis through focussing on a few very specific aspects of 
Ricoeur’s work.  Both the full spectrum of Ricoeur’s analysis and the two principle 
aspects that drive it can be gleaned from the following two quotations. At the 
beginning of book 1 he states, “The major antithesis around which my reflections will 
revolve . . . [:]two features are set in opposition to one another, features which the 
author, with his marked taste for sonorous antithesis, coins intentio and distentio 
animi.”3  From near the end of book three we can pull out a statement that qualifies 
the relationship between time and language, declared as the hypothesis that 
oriented the work from the very beginning; he states, “temporality cannot be spoken 
of in the direct discourse of phenomenology, but rather requires the mediation of the 
indirect discourse of narration.”4  
 
So it seems that narration, text, the architectural project, any cultural production, is a 
necessary artifice that mediates being-in-the-world, or temporality.  Therefore, mindful 
of the futurity of Heidegger’s Dasien, which is the basic character of projection that 
befits its temporality5, the question to be pursued here is what kind of text might be 
produced when we can call upon a deeper understanding of the phenomenology 
of time, or as Ricoeur suggests, the “aporetics of temporality”6, and with willingness to 
go along with the to-and-fro between distention and intention as it informs, orients 
and re-orients representational exchange in the course of production? 
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